Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2001 21:53:08 -0400 (EDT)
From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
To: cert-advisory@cert.org
Subject: CERT Advisory CA-2001-21
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CERT Advisory CA-2001-21 Buffer Overflow in telnetd
Original release date: July 24, 2001
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
Systems running versions of telnetd derived from BSD source.
Overview
The telnetd program is a server for the Telnet remote virtual terminal
protocol. There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet
daemons derived from BSD source code. This vulnerability can crash the
server, or be leveraged to gain root access.
I. Description
There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet daemons
derived from BSD source code. During the processing of the Telnet
protocol options, the results of the "telrcv" function are stored in a
fixed-size buffer. It is assumed that the results are smaller than the
buffer and no bounds checking is performed.
The vulnerability was discovered by TESO. An exploit for this
vulnerability has been publicly released; internal testing at CERT/CC
confirms this exploit works against at least one target system. For
more information, see
http://www.team-teso.net/advisories/teso-advisory-011.tar.gz
II. Impact
An intruder can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
telnetd process, typically root.
III. Solution
Apply a patch
Appendix A contains information from vendors who have provided
information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we
receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the
CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
directly.
Restrict access to the Telnet service (typically port 23/tcp) using a
firewall or packet-filtering technology.
Until a patch can be applied, you may wish to block access to the
Telnet service from outside your network perimeter. This will limit
your exposure to attacks. However, blocking port 23/tcp at a network
perimeter would still allow attackers within the perimeter of your
network to exploit the vulnerability. It is important to understand
your network's configuration and service requirements before deciding
what changes are appropriate.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
BSDI
All current versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable. Patches are available
via our web site at http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/patches and
via ftp at ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/support/patches as soon as testing
has been completed.
Cisco Systems
Cisco IOS does not appear to be vulnerable. Certain non-IOS products
are supplied on other operating system platforms which themselves may
be vulnerable as described elsewhere in this CERT Advisory. The Cisco
PSIRT is continuing to investigate the vulnerability to be certain
and, if necessary, will provide updates to the CERT and publish an
advisory. Cisco Security Advisories are on-line at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt/.
FreeBSD
All released versions of FreeBSD are vulnerable to this problem, which
was fixed in FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE and FreeBSD 3.5.1-STABLE on July 23,
2001. An advisory has been released, along with a patch to correct the
vulnerability and a binary upgrade package suitable for use on FreeBSD
4.3-RELEASE systems. For more information, see the advisory at the
following location:
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01:49.telnetd.asc
or use an FTP mirror site from the following URL:
http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mirrors-ftp.html
Hewlett-Packard
[This issue is] actively under investigation to determine
vulnerability ramifications.
Sun Microsystems
Sun is currently investigating and have confirmed that one can make
the in.telnetd daemon dump core but Sun has not yet determined if this
issue is potentially exploitable on Solaris.
Appendix B. - References
1. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0854.txt
2. http://www.team-teso.net/advisories/teso-advisory-011.tar.gz
3. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/745371
4. ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01:49.telnetd.asc
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT Coordination Center thanks TESO, who published an advisory on
this issue. We would also like to thank Jeff Polk for technical
assistance.
_________________________________________________________________
Authors: Jason A. Rafail, Ian A. Finlay, and Shawn V. Hernan.
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-21.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
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______________________________________________________________________
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Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
July 24, 2001: Initial release
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