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setproctitle (3)
  • >> setproctitle (3) ( FreeBSD man: Библиотечные вызовы )

  • BSD mandoc
     

    NAME

    setproctitle
    
     - set process title
    
     
    

    SYNOPSIS

       #include <sys/types.h>
       #include <unistd.h>
    void setproctitle (const char *fmt ...);
     

    DESCRIPTION

    The setproctitle ();
    library routine sets the process title that appears on the ps(1) command.

    The title is set from the executable's name, followed by the result of a printf(3) style expansion of the arguments as specified by the fmt argument. If the fmt argument begins with a ``-'' character, the executable's name is skipped.

    If fmt is NULL, the process title is restored.  

    EXAMPLES

    To set the title on a daemon to indicate its activity:
    setproctitle("talking to %s", inet_ntoa(addr));
    
     

    SEE ALSO

    ps(1), w(1), kvm(3), kvm_getargv3, printf(3)  

    STANDARDS

    The setproctitle ();
    function is implicitly non-standard. Other methods of causing the ps(1) command line to change, including copying over the argv[0] string are also implicitly non-portable. It is preferable to use an operating system supplied setproctitle ();
    if present.

    Unfortunately, it is possible that there are other calling conventions to other versions of setproctitle (,);
    although none have been found by the author as yet. This is believed to be the predominant convention.

    It is thought that the implementation is compatible with other systems, including Nx and Bs x .  

    HISTORY

    The setproctitle ();
    function first appeared in Fx 2.2 . Other operating systems have similar functions.  

    AUTHORS

    An -nosplit An Peter Wemm Aq peter@FreeBSD.org stole the idea from the Sendmail 8.7.3 source code by An Eric Allman Aq eric@sendmail.org .  

    BUGS

    Never pass a string with user-supplied data as a format without using `%s' An attacker can put format specifiers in the string to mangle your stack, leading to a possible security hole. This holds true even if the string was built using a function like snprintf (,);
    as the resulting string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers for later interpolation by setproctitle (.);

    Always use the proper secure idiom:

    setproctitle("%s", string);


     

    Index

    NAME
    SYNOPSIS
    DESCRIPTION
    EXAMPLES
    SEE ALSO
    STANDARDS
    HISTORY
    AUTHORS
    BUGS


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